NEGLIGENCE—CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE—TAKING MANIFEST RISK TO SAVE PROPERTY.—THOMPSON V. SEABOARD AIR LINE RY., 62 S. E. 396 (S. C.).—*Held,* that it is not contributory negligence *per se* for one whose property is endangered to take a manifest risk to save it, unless the risk was wanton and unreasonable.

A person may attempt to save his property which is threatened or imperiled. *Liming v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.,* 81 Iowa 246; *Hall v. Huber,* 61 Mo. App. 384. But the weight of authority is that one cannot take an obvious risk which is likely to result in serious injury without being guilty of such negligence as will preclude a recovery for personal damages sustained in so doing. *Morris v. Ry Co.,* 148 N. Y. 182; *Cook v. Johnson,* 58 Mich. 437. The taking of a moderate degree of personal risk, however, even in the face of obvious danger, would probably not be regarded as a fault in some circumstances. *Sherman and Redfield on Negligence,* § 85. The test generally is whether a reasonably prudent man would have acted in like manner. *Rexter v. Starin,* 73 N. Y. 601; *Pegram v. Searboard Air Line Ry.,* 139 N. C. 303.

RAILROADS—JOINT USE OF TRACKS—LIABILITY FOR INJURIES FROM NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF TRAINS.—HANBLE *v.* ATCHISON, T. & SF. E. RY. CO., 164 FED. 41.—*Held,* that where the trains of one railroad company in charge of its own employes run over the tracks of another company under a contract that they shall obey the orders of the train dispatcher of the latter company, such contract does not relieve the company so using the tracks from liability for injuries caused to third persons by the negligence of its employes operating its trains in no way attributable to any order of the train dispatcher.

Atwood v. Chi., R. I. & Pac., 72 Fed. 447, held, that where the defendant company has no right or power to direct the movement of its trains over the tracks of the other company it could not be held responsible to third parties on the doctrine of *respondeat superior,* for any negligence of the men in charge of train, even though they were their own employes. *Clark v. Geer,* 86 Fed. 447, however, holds that where trains of one company in charge of its own employes run over the tracks of another company under contract, that they shall obey the orders of the train dispatcher of the latter company, such contract does not relieve the company so using the tracks from liability for negligence of its own employes. *Chi., R. I. & Pac. v. Greves,* 56 Kan. 601.

SUICIDE—AIDING.—SAUNDERS V. STATE, 112 S. W. 68 (TEX.).—*Held,* that one who furnishes another the means for committing suicide, knowing that he intends to kill himself, is not guilty of a crime.

At common law, one who assisted another to kill himself was guilty of murder. 4 Bl. Com. 189. But owing to the technical rule, that the principal must first be tried and convicted, he escaped punishment. *Rex. v. Russell,* 1 Moody C. C. 356. In many jurisdictions in this country, one who, with knowledge, assists another to commit suicide, is guilty of murder as a principal. *Commonwealth v. Bowen,* 13 Mass. 356. Even furnishing poison to another, knowing that he intends to commit suicide, is regarded as a mode of administering it. *Blackburn v. State,* 23 Ohio St. 146. Where this crime